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When contemporary philosophers of art make the radical and rather
astonishing statement that art has existed for only two centuries,1 they are
referring to the insufficiently appreciated fact that the abstract concept
“art” is a construction of Western culture and in fact has a discernible
historical origin.2 It was only in the late eighteenth century—in
Enlightenment England and Germany—and subsequently, that the
subject of aesthetics was named and developed, that “the aesthetic” came
to be regarded as a distinctive kind of experience, and that an art world of
academies, museums, galleries, dealers, critics, journals, and scholars
arose to address a type of human artifact that was made primarily and
often specifically for acquisition and display. At the same time, ideas of
genius, creative imagination, self-expression, originality, communication,
and emotion, having originated in other contexts, became increasingly
and even primarily or exclusively associated with the subject of “art.” (see
Chapter 7) The concepts “primitive” and “natural” that I referred to
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briefly in the preceding chapters also developed at this time to become
part of modern Western cultural consciousness.
Previously, the sorts of objects that in the post-eighteenth century
West came to be called art—paintings, sculptures, ceramics, music, dance,
poetry, and so forth—were made to embody or to reinforce religious or
civic values, and rarely, if ever, for purely aesthetic purposes. Paintings
and sculptures served as portraits, illustrations, interior or exterior
decoration; ceramics were vessels for use; music and dance were part of a
ceremonial or special social occasion; poetry was storytelling or praise or
oratory to sway an audience. Even when beauty, skill, or ostentation were
important qualities of an object, they did not exist “for their own sake,”
but as an enhancement of the object’s ostensible if not actual use. This
enhancement would be called beautification or adornment, not art.  The
word art as used before the late eighteenth century meant what we would
today call “craft” or “skill” or “well-madeness,” and could characterize
any object or activity made or performed by human (rather than natural
or divine) agency—for example, the art of medicine, of retailing, of
holiday dining.
It may be a surprise to realize how peculiar our modern Western
notion of art really is—how it is dependent on and intertwined with ideas
of commerce, commodity, ownership, history, progress, specialization,
and individuality—and to recognize the truth that only a few societies
have thought of it even remotely as we do (Alsop, 1982). Of course, in the
preindustrial West and elsewhere, people had and continue to have
“aesthetic” ideas—notions of what makes something beautiful or
excellent-of-its-kind—but such ideas can be held without tacitly assuming
that there is a superordinate abstract category, Art, to which belong some
paintings, drawings, or carvings and not other paintings, drawings, or
carvings.3
As Western aesthetics developed, something was assigned to the
category of genuine art if it was deemed capable of providing and
sustaining genuine aesthetic experience. Genuine aesthetic experience
was defined as something one experienced when contemplating genuine
art. Note the circularity of this argument. Moreover, difficulties arose in
specifying the cause or location of this genuineness (in the fact of
differences of opinion about the validity of individual works or
responses). People should have recognized that these difficulties threw
the concepts of a pure or singular art itself into doubt.
To be sure, philosophers and artists in the past (for example,
Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Leonardo da Vinci) had proposed
criteria for beauty or excellence, for example, fitness, clarity, harmony,
radiance, a mirror held up to nature. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century
thinkers proposed other criteria, such as truth, order, unity in variety, and





But, as every first-year student of Western aesthetics learns,
determining what is beauty or truth, not to mention significance or
harmony, is no less difficult than defining art in the first place. And in
any case, since the Romantic period, artists themselves (influenced by the
ever-growing Western cultural emphasis on individualism and
originality) have deliberately flouted and contradicted the canonic
aesthetic features, as they were described or proposed by philosophers,
critics, and other thinkers, as if to demonstrate that art, whatever its
essence or validity, is protean, undefinable, and irreducible.
Hence the search for a common denominator, some quality or
feature that characterizes all instances of art, that makes something “Art,”
gradually became both outmoded and a lost cause. Today’s philosophers
of art have totally abandoned trying to define the word or the concept.
Looking at the plural and radical nature of the arts in our time, aware of
the economic ramifications where canvases may be “worth” millions of
dollars and where critics, dealers, and museum directors rather than
artists or publics largely decide this value, philosophers concerned with
art have concluded that art no longer exists (if it ever did) in a vacuum or
ideal realm for its own sake, with its sacred essence waiting to be
discovered, but must be considered as it appears in and is dependent on a
particular social context. In a postindustrial, postmodern society, an art
world (or “artworld”) determines what “Art” is and what is “Art.” It
exists, if at all, only as a socially and historically conditioned label (see
Chapter 7).
The reader must recognize, however, that this position arises from
contemporary postmodern Western society, which despite our natural
ethnocentrism (referred to also in Chapters 1 and 4) is not, of course, the
apogee of humankind’s enterprise and wisdom nor its ultimate destiny.
We must not forget that although “Art” as a concept seems to have been
born of and continues to be sustained by a commercial society, is
therefore only roughly two centuries old, and hence is relative, even
discardable, the arts have always been with us. And so have ideas of
beauty, sublimity, and transcendence, along with the verities of the
human condition: love, death, memory, suffering, power, fear, loss,
desire, hope, and so forth. These have been the subject matter of and
occasion for the arts throughout human history. Thus, when
contemporary theory accepts that art is continent and dependent on “a
particular social context,” the mistake should not be made of assuming
that the abiding human concerns and the arts that have immemorially
been their accompaniment and embodiment are themselves contingent
and dependent.
The species-centric view of art recognizes and proclaims as valid
and intrinsic the association between what humans have always found to
be important and certain ways—called “the arts”—that they have found
to grasp, manifest, and reinforce this importance. That the arts in
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postmodern society do not perform these functions, at least to the extent
that they do in premodern societies, is not because of some deficiency, or
insubstantiality of an abstract concept but because their makers inhabit a
world—unprecedented in human history—in which these abiding
concerns are artificially disguised, denied, trivialized, ignored, or
banished.
An ethological view of art, then, departs from the entrenched
position of contemporary aesthetics and reinstates the search for a
“common denominator,” although in a manner never dreamed of by
philosophers of art. In order to show that a behavior of art is universal
and indelible, it is necessary to identify a core behavioral tendency upon which
natural selection could act.
In trying to uncover this deep marrow of a behavior of art, we will
not be primarily concerned with contemporary society, nor even with
earlier civilizations or with traditional or what used to be called
‘primitive’ societies. Rather, we must look for a behavioral tendency that
could have been possessed by protohumans, the early hominids who
existed one to four million years ago. These, our ancestors, were creatures
who walked on two legs and lived in small, nomadic bands on the
African Savannah. They hunted, foraged, scavenged, and gathered their
food, as hominids did until about 10,000 B.C. when settled agricultural
communities began to establish themselves in certain parts of the world.
Somewhere in this continuum of hominid evolution will have arisen a
behavioral tendency that helped individuals who possessed it (and by
extension a social group whose members had it) to survive better than
individuals and groups who lacked the tendency. This core or common
denominator of art will, however, be a behavioral tendency that is not
incompatible with art today and elsewhere, yet can also characterize
creatures such as these, our hominid ancestors.
The Extra-Ordinary
In my view, the biological core of art, the stain that is deeply dyed in the
behavioral marrow of humans everywhere, is something I have
elsewhere called “making special.” Like other key phrases used to name
or summarize a complex concept (“pleasure principle,””survival of the
fittest”), “making special” can without elaboration or context sound
trivial or woolly. Before describing it in more detail, here and in the next
chapter, I would like to recount briefly the background of my search for
this core tendency that I believe lies behind or within what is today





My own earliest attempts to approach art as a behavior began when I first
read ethological accounts of play. Play in animals (including humans) is
an appealing and quite mysterious behavior. It occurs in many species in
which animals play naturally, without being taught. Yet, unlike other
behaviors, play seems to be, at the time of playing at least, biologically
purposeless and even disadvantageous. The players do not gain a life-
serving goal, as they do in other behaviors where they find food, mate,
repel an intruder, rest, and so on. In fact, animals at play seem to expend
a lot of energy for no useful purpose and risk hurting themselves,
attracting predators, or otherwise decreasing their chances of survival.
Yet young animals will play indefatigably. They seem to play for play’s
sake, for sheer enjoyment and intrinsic reward. Thus it would seem that
play has hidden survival benefits that outweigh the costs of its energy
expenditure and risks.
In play, novelty and unpredictability are actively sought, whereas in
real life we do not usually like uncertainty. Wondering whether an
untried shortcut will take us to the bank before it closes on the day before
a holiday is different from choosing an unknown path just to see where it
will lead while on holiday.
Play can be said to be “extra,” something outside normal life. At
least normal constraints do not hold. At play, you can be a princess, a
mother, or a horse. You can be strong and invincible. You can act like, be
like, a desperado or a soldier.  You pretend to fight or pretend to have a
tea party, but these are “not for real.” Real weapons (like loaded guns or
unsheathed claws) are not used; the teacups may be empty.
But play is marked by constraints nevertheless. One generally finds,
even in animals, “rules” of play: special signals (such as wagging the tail
or not using claws), postures, facial expressions, and sounds that mean
“This is make-believe.” Often, special places are set aside for playing: a
stadium, a gymnasium, a park, a recreation room, a ring or circle. There
are special times, special clothes, a special mood for play—think of
holidays, festivals, vacations, weekends.
As I read about play, its similarities to art became obvious. Art, as I
know it from aesthetics and art history classes, is “nonutilitarian,” ”for its
own sake”: Cellini’s saltcellar was art, but not because it held salt better
than a clay or glass container. Art, like play, was not “real” but pretend:
the actor playing Hamlet did not really stab the actor playing Polonius.
Art made exquisite use of surprise and ambiguity. There were special
places like museums and concert halls set aside for art, special times, even
special clothes for it—such as dark attire for symphony musicians. And
there was especially a special mood, which I had learned to describe as
“disinterested contemplation”: one did not rush up on stage to help the
hero overcome the villain; one did contemplate the skill and subtlety of
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the actors, the craft and language of the playwright. Art, like play, was
something extra, an embellishment, an enhancement to life.
As I looked further into the subject, I discovered I was only the
latest in a long lineage to have noticed the resemblance between play and
art and to have gone on to conclude that art was a derivative of play.4 The
new contribution I hoped to offer was making this conclusion plausible
by means of ethological (rather than, as others had done, from
psychological or historical or metaphysical) evidence. I thought that the
“metaphorical” nature of both art and play, the make-believe aspect
where something is, in reality, something else, was the salient core
feature.
For an ethologist, the apparent absence of evolutionary purpose is a
problem both for play and for art. Because humans everywhere avidly
engage in both playful and artistic pursuits, these must serve some
purpose, even if it is not immediately evident.
With regard to play, it is generally agreed that although there might
not be immediate survival benefits associated with play, young animals
in play are practicing (in situations that are not yet “for keeps”) skills that
eventually enable them to find food, defend themselves, and mate,
among other adult necessities. Also—importantly—in play, they learn
how to get along with others. Individuals who play, and thereby learn
practical and social skills, survive better than individuals who are not
inclined to play or who are deprived of play and therefore lack practice
with these essential things. As with an insurance policy, the benefits of
play are deferred.
Looking at art, I was aware that it consisted of more than exercise,
practice, or socialization. But what? Freud claimed that the function of
both play and art was therapy. They allowed for fantasy, for the
sublimation or fulfillment of hidden wishes that in real life were denied
or tabooed: if you can’t get the girl, dream or fantasize or write a story or
paint a picture about getting her. As I considered the problem from an
ethological point of view, I concluded that art in human evolution must
have done something more than give fantasy free rein. How much
fantasy did our hominid ancestors practice anyway? Did they need more
make-believe than they acquired from play? (It is almost certain that early
hominids, like all primates, must have played.) Was it not more
important that they accept and comply with reality: the daily “business”
of meals, safety, cooperation?5 Fantasy and make-believe may well be
important safety valves for modern humans mired in the discontents of
civilization, but I hoped to find a more plausible reason to explain why
early hominids would have developed art as well as or in addition to play.
Practice, socialization, recreation, wish-fulfillment—these goals could
have satisfied by play without necessitating another sort of behavior that
accomplished the same ends. Unless I was willing to accept the idea that




explanation, I had to look further into the matter of its ethological origin,
nature, and probable selective value.
During the years that I lived in Sri Lanka, the small Buddhist
country formerly known as Ceylon, I became acquainted with what
sociologists call a traditional society. In such societies, modern technology
is still made of bamboo tied together, and people, rather than backhoes
and bulldozers, move the earth. Many families still live on the land and
are relatively self-sufficient; village houses and utensils are largely made
by hand from local materials, and food is grown in the family garden.
Custom and authority continue to provide the boundaries within which
people lead their lives and find their satisfactions—most marriages are
arranged by parents or other relatives, for example, and it is not
considered unusual for important decisions to be made only after
consulting an astrologer.
People living in traditional societies seem much closer to the verities
of life than people living in highly technological societies like our own.
Because they have known each other’s families for generations, events
like weddings and funerals—matters of life and death—are important
occasions for socializing. I attended my first funeral and saw a dead body
for the first time while in Sri Lanka, and I was initially amazed that babies
and small children were also in attendance.
Traditional ceremony and custom thus play a much larger part in
the life of a Sri Lankan than in ours. After a person dies in Sri Lanka, the
mourners arrive during the course of the day at the home where the
deceased is lying in an open coffin on a table in the living room,
surrounded by flowers. The bereaved family members greet each visitor
at the door, breaking down in sobs with each new arrival as they talk
about the circumstances of the death and the merits of the deceased. The
guest enters the house and joins other guests; they chat quietly with each
other about any subject (I heard discussions about movies, business, and
political matters); and after a decent interval, they leave. Eventually the
family and close friends go to the place of cremation or burial where
Buddhist monks join them and recite the appropriate Pali
texts—reflections on birth, death, decay, and reincarnation. Three days
after the disposition of the body, the family and priests hold an
almsgiving ceremony; other almsgivings in memory of the deceased
occur after three months, one year, and at yearly intervals thereafter.
I realized that this kind of formalized handling of grief, with
regular, community-sanctioned opportunities to weep and express one’s
loss at greater and greater intervals of time, gave to the bereaved a sort of
patterned program to follow, a form that could shape and contain their
feelings. Instead of having to suppress their grief and sense of loss in the
interests of being brave or “realistic,” or having to release it haphazardly
or in solitude, the bereaved is enabled—compelled—by the ritual of
mourning to acknowledge and express it publicly, over and over again,
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within a preordained structure. The temporal structure of the mourning
ritual, simple as it is, assures that thoughts and feelings about one’s loss
will be reiterated at prescribed times. Even if one might not consciously
have proper mournful feelings, the custom of successive almsgivings
ensures that these feelings are elicited. The prescribed formal ceremonies
become the occasion for and event the cause of individuals feeling and
publicly expressing their sorrow.6
It occurred to me that in a very similar way, the arts also are
containers for, molders of, feeling. The performance of a play, a dance, or
a musical composition manipulates the audience’s response: expands,
contracts, excites, calms, releases. The rhythm and form of a poem do the
same thing. Even nontemporal arts, like painting, sculpture, and
architecture, structure the viewer’s response and give the form a feeling.
It is well known that in most societies the arts are commonly
associated with ceremonial contexts, with rituals. So next I began to try to
discover what art and ritual had in common. It was intriguing to learn
that “ritualized behavior” in animals, like play, was an important
ethological subject and that at least some anthropologists noted real, not
just superficial, parallels between ritualized behavior in animals and
ceremonial rituals in human (Huxley, 1966; Turner, 1983). Perhaps like
ritual (and play), one could call art “a behavior” also.
As I had suspected and hoped, the similarities between ceremonial
ritual and art were provocative. For example, both ritual and art are
compelling. They use various effective means to arouse, capture, and hold
attention. Both are fashioned with the intent to affect individuals
emotionally—to bring their feelings into awareness, to display them. A
large part of the compelling nature of rituals and art is that they are
deliberately nonordinary. In Sri Lankan—and our own—funeral services,
for example, unusual language is used: ancient religious works with their
archaic and poetic vocabulary and word order serves as texts for the
services, and these texts are intoned or chanted in a voice unlike that
employed in normal discourse. Other nonordinary devices for making
ritual (and art) compelling include exaggeration (the rhythm of funeral
processions may be unusually slow and deliberate), repetition (the Sri
Lankan funeral ritual punctuates time with repeated almsgivings), and
elaboration (the profusion of flowers, the wearing of special clothing,
other extravagances like the gathering of unusually large numbers of
people).
The stylization of ritual and art also adds to their nonordinary
aspect. They are self-consciously performed as if acted. During the
ceremonial signing of a bill, the president of the United States speaks
highly rhetorical phrases sanctified by use reaching back two hundred
years, things like “Thereunto I set this seal.” The ballerina or opera singer
makes a ritualized—exaggerated, elaborated, formalized—series of bows




was composed of exaggerated, elaborated, and formalized movements or
vocalizations).
Thus, in general, both rituals and art are f o r m a l i z e d .
Movements—what people do—are prescribed, the order of events is
structured, and the individual participants’ perceptions, emotions, and
interpretations are thereby shaped.
Ritual ceremonies and the arts are socially reinforcing, uniting their
participants and their audiences in one mood. They both provide an
occasion for feelings of individual transcendence of the self—what Victor
Turner (1969) calls communitas and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1975) calls
“flow”—everyone shares in the same occasion of patterned emotion. For
a time, the hard edges of their customary isolation from each other are
softened or melted together or their everyday taken-for-granted
comradeship is reinforced.
Rituals and the arts are bracketed, set off from real or ordinary life. A
stage of some kind—a circle, a demarcated area, a museum, or
platform—sets off the holy from the profane, the performers from the
audience, the extra-ordinary from the everyday. And both rituals and the
arts make conspicuous use of symbols: things have hidden or arcane
meanings, reverberations beyond their apparent surface significance.
Ritual ceremonies are universal, found in every human society.
They serve numerous social purposes: they state and publicly reinforce
the values of a group of people; they unite it in common purpose and
belief; they “explain” the inexplicable—birth, death, illness, natural
disaster—and attempt to control it and make it bearable. From the
ethological perspective, people in social groups that did not have
ceremonial rituals would not survive as well as those who did have them.
They would be less cohesive and cooperative; they would respond to
adversity in individualized, fragmented, unfocused, and ultimately less
satisfactory ways.
Apart from the many similarities that ritual and art share as general
“behaviors,” they are virtually always linked together in practice. During
ritual ceremonies one invariably finds the arts: the use of beautiful or
arresting objects, the wearing of specially decorated attire, music, visual
display, poetic language, dance, performances. It seemed nondebatable to
me that an understanding of ceremonial ritual was relevant, even critical,
to an ethological understanding of art (see Chapter 4).
Because of the many close connections between art and ritual, I first
wondered whether art could be considered as a derivative of ritual, much
as I had earlier thought of art as a kind of play.7 After struggling to make
sense of how and why this might have happened, an idea came to me: art
was not a variety of play or ritual, but like them it was concerned with a
special order, realm, mood, state of being. In play, ritual, and art things
were not ordinary—they are less real or more real than everyday reality. I
decided now to try looking there for the behavioral core of art.
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Differentiating Ordinary from Extra-Ordinary
My thesis that the evolution and selective value of a behavior of art arises
from a tendency to make special rests on the claim that humans
everywhere, in a manner that is unlike that of other animals, differentiate
between an order, realm, mood, or state of being that is mundane,
ordinary, or “natural,” and one that is unusual, extra-ordinary, or “super-
natural.”
But is this a justifiable claim? In some premodern societies the
former and the latter appear to interpenetrate. According to Robert
Tonkinson (1978, p. 96), the Mardudjara, an Australian aboriginal group,
make no clear distinction between natural and spiritual realms,
considering themselves and nonhuman entities and forces to be all
equally real inhabitants of their cosmic order.8 Other peoples, in Australia
and elsewhere, similarly find “natural” and “spiritual” to be more
continuous than we do—to consider the spiritual as natural. One might
wonder whether an “obvious” separation between ordinary and extra-
ordinary, like that between profane and sacred, natural and super-
natural, nature and culture, body and soul, flesh and spirit, is to be traced
to the discontents and artificialities of civilization.
I am prepared to claim, however, that making such a distinction is a
characterizing universal predisposition of human behavior and mentality.
Moreover, I would argue that it is in this predisposition that we are to
look for the core of a behavior of art. Even in human groups that do not
articulate an explicit separation between extra-ordinary and ordinary,
their actions demonstrate such an awareness. Tonkinson himself says of
the Mardudjara: “the Dreamtime [the spiritual dimension or domain in
which ancestral beings have their existence] is crucial because it is held to
be the source of all power, given in response to ritual performance, but
also available to individuals when they are able briefly to transcend their
humanity and tap this reservoir (for example, during dance, trance, visions,
dreams, and heightened emotional and religious states.” (Tonkinson, 1978, p.
16; my italics)
Many anthropological studies describe “other worlds”: the
mysterious permanent dimension of reality that the Yoruba call iron
(Drewal & Drewal, 1983); the spirit of the forest of the Ituri forest
pygmies (Turnbull, 1961); the engang, or unseen world of dead spirits, of
the Fang of Gabon (Fernandez, 1973); the Eskimo sila or “life force”
(Birket-Smith, 1959); the kore (“wilderness”) of the Gimi, otherworldly
compared to dusa, the domesticated forms of plants and animals and the
constraints of human social existence (Gillison, 1980, p. 144); the
transcendent reality of the Umeda which is grasped only through rituals
that are the antithesis or opposite of what usually is (Gell, 1975); the




hyperanimacy of the powerful beings that the Kalapalo communally sing
into being (Basso, 1985); the kia experience of Bushmen (Katz, 1982)—one
would be hard-pressed to find an anthropological monograph about a
people that did not recognize or manifest by their actions the recognition
of a nonordinary if not sacred dimension along with everyday reality.
How and why would evolving humans perceive or create “other
worlds” apart from the everyday? As I pointed out in the previous
section, the penchant for acknowledging an extra-ordinary realm is
inherent in the behavior of play, where actions are “not for real.” The “as-
ifness” of play, then, can be thought of as a reservoir from which more
flexible, imaginative, innovative behaviors can arise—as when we “play
around with” an idea. And in ritual also (both the ritualized behaviors of
animals and human ritual ceremonies), ordinary behavior is formalized
and exaggerated, thereby (particularly in humans) acquiring a meaning
and weight that makes it different from what is usually is: it becomes
extra-ordinary. It seems undeniable that at some point, evolving
hominids, being acquainted in their daily lives with play and ritual,
would have been predisposed (as individuals and eventually as a species)
to recognize and even create “meta-” or “as-if” realities.
Yet it must be admitted that at the most fundamental level, being
able to distinguish between ordinary and extra-ordinary is not a
particularly remarkable ability at all. Every animal is equipped to
differentiate the normal from the abnormal, the neutral from the extreme.
A salamander or mosquito, as well as more complex forms of life, will
know when there is a change that suggests something out of the ordinary
might occur: a sudden shadow, a sharp noise, an unexpected movement.
Life, after all, depends on reacting (or being ready to react) to changes in
habitual existence. Moreover, many nonhuman animals also play, but did
not go on to invent arts or imaginative works of any kind. And
formalized, ritualized behaviors, analogous to ritual ceremonies in
humans in their use of rare and extra-ordinary postures, odors, sounds,
and movements (Geist, 1978), are also widespread in other animals but
have not given rise in them to anything we can justifiably call art. What
was it about humans that provoked or permitted them to recognize and
then proceed to further elaborate “other” worlds, special fanciful worlds
like those invented in play, invoked in ritual, or fabricated in the arts?
The evolving hominids we are concerned with—say, a quarter of a
million years ago—were more intelligent and resourceful than other
animals. Their brains were larger and more intricately composed, and the
mental and emotional complexity this endowment permitted led to a
wider range of thought and feeling. Whereas other animals can be
assumed to inhabit a continuous present, generally unconcerned with
what happened yesterday and what might happen tomorrow, gradually
during the Middle or Early Upper Paleolithic, humans must have
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become, as Walter Burket (1987, p. 172) has remarked with regard to the
biological origins of religion, “painfully aware of past and future.”
I suggest that the standard and unexceptional animal inclination to
differentiate ordinary from extra-ordinary, to recognize specialness,
would have been developing over tens of thousands of years, along with
other higher-level cognitive abilities that were also evolving, such as
planning ahead or assessing causes and their consequences. 9 At some
point in their evolution, humans began deliberately to set out to make
things special or extra-ordinary, perhaps for the purpose of influencing the
outcome of important events that were perceived as uncertain and
troubling, requiring action beyond simple fight or flight, approach or
avoidance (see Chapter 4).10
A Closer Look at Making Special
In What Is Art For? I proposed that we could understand the arts
ethologically by considering them as ways of making important things
and activities “special.” That is to say, I emphasized the “behavior” or
activity (as described in the last section of Chapter 2 above), rather than,
as other art theorists have done, the results: the things and activities
themselves as “works of art.”
I suggested that elements of what we today call the arts (e.g.,
pattern, vividness) would have existed first in nonaesthetic contexts. But
because these elements were inherently gratifying (perceptually,
emotionally, cognitively) to humans, humans who had an inherent
proclivity for making special would use them—not for their own sake,
but instead, in ethological terms, as “enabling mechanisms”—in the
performance of other selectively valuable behaviors.
To begin with, I thought that the reason making special first
occurred might have been to persuade oneself and others that what was
being done was worthwhile and effective. This is a reason for
embellishment in other species—notably songbirds, who elaborate their
songs much more than is necessary simply to advertise their presence or
individuality. My reasoning went something like this. If you are an early
human who wants to achieve a goal—to kill an animal, for example, or to
cure a sickness—you will take pains, take the activity seriously. If you
accidentally or deliberately say or do something extra, and are successful,
you may well remember to do the extra something again the next time,
just in case, as when a baseball player touches his cap and ear in a certain
way before throwing a pitch, or a performer or pilot always carries a
particular trinket that has in the past brought her or him good luck.
It is clear that taking serious and important activities seriously
should be of immense survival value. Every bit of psychological




observe you. (As I pointed out, people who spent time and trouble to
reinforce and elaborate deleterious things would not have survived.)
The idea of making special as persuasion or rhetoric seemed
promising. Making life-serving implements (tools, weapons) special both
expressed and reinforced their importance to individuals and would have
assured their more careful manufacture and use. But equally or more
important would have been the contribution of making special to ritual
ceremonies. When language was used poetically (with stress, compelling
rhythm, rhyme, noteworthy similes or word choice); when costumes or
décor were striking and extravagant; when choruses, dances, and
recitations allowed vicarious or actual audience participation, the content
of the ceremonies would have been more memorable than when left
“untreated.” Whatever message the ceremony intended to communicate
(“In union is strength”; “Death is an end and a beginning”; “We are the
best”; “Transitions are scary but unavoidable”; “We need food for the
coming season”) would be first engendered and then reinforced,
acquiring special import by virtue of the special effort and attention
expended upon it. At the same time, the fellow-feeling arising from the
mutual participation and shared emotion was a microcosmic acting out of
the general cooperation and coordination that was essential for small
groups to survive in a violent, unpredictable world.11 Groups whose
individual members had the tendency to make things special would have
had more unifying ritual ceremonies, and thus these individuals and
groups would have survived better than individuals and groups that did
not.
In ritual ceremonies, then, one can see that making special could
acquire even more importance than in individual occurrences. Because it
is used to articulate substantive and vital concerns, it is drawn from,
expresses, and engages one’s deepest and strongest feelings. This is an
important point that I introduced in Chapter 2 and to which I will
frequently return in this chapter and the ones that follow.
The Relationship of Making Special and Art
As I described in Chapters 1 and 2, I was first led to develop the concept
of making special because of my dissatisfaction with Western culture’s
general perplexity surrounding the notion of art and, reflecting this
confusion, the inadequacy of the available speculations about the role of
the arts in human evolution.  It seemed to me that if evolutionists did not
recognize Homo aestheticus, that is, could not satisfactorily explain how
and why art was a human universal and could view it only as an
epiphenomenon, their concept of art itself must aberrant. Something so
widespread, pleasurable, and obviously important to those who did it
should not be so inexplicable.
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Trapped in the confines and presuppositions of my culture’s
concepts and attitudes regarding art, I too floundered and took circuitous
detours around the subject, as when I tried for a time to derive art from
play or art from ritual. I continually returned to the quality in the arts of
all times and places of being extra-ordinary, outside the daily routine and
not strictly utilitarian (in a materialistic, ultimate sense)—even when
considered “necessary” to their practitioners. That was where
evolutionary explanations always broke down because something
“nonutilitarian” should not have been selected for. Yet nonetheless it
existed.
The best word for this characteristic of the arts seemed to be special.
Extraordinary with a hyphen might have served, but it is too easily read
as “astonishing” or “remarkable”—that is, as a synonym for non-
hyphenated extraordinary. Unnecessary and nonutilitarian emphasize what
the arts are not, and also smack too much of Western ideas of art-for-art’s-
sake. Elaboration used alone disregards the importance of shaping, and
like enhance suggests, in Western culture at least, the superficial or merely
added. While “special” might seem too imprecise and naively simple, or
suggest mere decoration, it easily encompassed an array of what is done
in making the arts that is generally different from making nonarts:
embellishing, exaggerating, patterning, juxtaposing, shaping, and
transforming,
“Special” also denotes a positive factor of care and concern that is
absent from the other words. It thus suggests that the special object or
activity appeals to emotional as well as perceptual and cognitive
factors—that is, to all aspects of our mental functioning. Even though all
three are inseparable, as I mentioned in the discussion of emotion in
Chapter 2, the usual aesthetic nomenclature (“for its own
sake,””beauty,””harmony,””contemplation”) tends to overemphasize
calm or abstract intellectual satisfactions at the expense of
sensory/emotional/physical/pleasurable ones. Hence “special” can
indicate that not only are our senses arrested by a thing’s perceptual
strikingness (specialness), and our intellects intrigued and stimulated by
its uncommonness (specialness), but that we make something special
because doing so gives us a way of expressing its positive emotional
valence for us, and the ways in which we accomplish this specialness not
only reflect but give unusual or special gratification and pleasure (i.e. are
aesthetic).
It is important to recognize that the elements used for making
something aesthetically special are normally themselves inherently
pleasing and gratifying to humans and thus can be called “aesthetic” or
“protoaesthetic” even when they occur naturally in nonaesthetic contexts.
These pleasing characteristics are those that would have been selected-for
in human evolution as indicating that something is wholesome and good:




smoothness, glossiness, warm or true colors, cleanness, fineness, or lack
of blemish, and vigor, precision, and comeliness of movement.
Thus we find that most, if not all, societies value agility, endurance,
and grace in dance; sonority, vividness, and rhythmic or phonic echoing
(rhyme and other poetic devices) in language; and resonance and power
in percussion. The Wahgi of Papua New Guinea’s Western Highlands, for
example, explicitly judge body decoration, dancing, drumming, and
ensemble performance in terms of their being rich, glossy, glinting, fiery,
slashing, shining, flaming, that is, as the converse of dull, dry, flaky,
matte, and lusterless (O’Hanlon, 1989; see also Chapter 5).
In the arts of the West, high value has also been given to skillfully
made polished marble statuary, implements and ornaments of burnished
metal, vivid glowing tempera and oil paintings, and ornately sumptuous
or softly diaphanous textiles. Indeed, it is the obvious lack of these
inherently pleasurable or “beautiful” features that has made it so difficult
for unsophisticated people to accept certain works of art made during the
past century or so as “art,” for the artists’ deliberate choices to defy
traditional expectations regarding pleasing characteristics have set their
works outside the pale of “recognizable” art.
In addition to elements that appeal to the senses, particularly vision
and hearing, there are others that are pleasing to the cognitive faculties:
repetition, pattern, continuity, clarity, dexterity, elaboration or variation
of a theme, contrast, balance, proportion. These qualities have to do with
comprehension, mastery, and hence security, and thus they are
recognized as “good,” when used outside a utilitarian context, to make
something special. Visual prototypes (e.g., fundamental geometric shapes
such as circles or other mandala forms like diagonal or upright crosses)
also clarify and control untidiness and are thought and felt to be
satisfying and good. (These and other “naturally aesthetic” or
protoaesthetic elements will be discussed more fully in Chapter 6.)
The responses to “specialness” in the aesthetic sense—“This is
(sensorily and emotionally as well as intellectually) gratifying and
special”—presumably evolved alongside other responses to
“specialness”—“This is dangerous, unprecedented, needs to be dealt
with.” As I suggested in speaking of salamanders and mosquitoes, not all
specialness engenders or results from gratifying “aesthetic” acts or
responses.
“Marking” of any kind for utilitarian identification, for example, the
X’s made by Hindus on the doors of railway cars that carried Moslems
during the Indian-Pakistani conflict after independence, is, strictly
speaking, making something special, as is the construction by a state
security police department of a special room, in a special place, without
windows and with unusual equipment, in which to extract confessions
from prisoners. But these unpleasant examples of “specialness” should
not be included in the notion I am developing here of aesthetic
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specialness: The intention to appeal to (that is, to attract and, if successful,
to satisfy) another’s faculty for apprehending and appreciating a
specialness that is more than what is necessary to fulfill a practical end.
Additionally the “artist” takes the protoaestheic elements out of their
“natural” context of indicating vitality and goodness, and “domesticates”
them—deliberately using them in aesthetic making special. (The idea of
domesticating the natural will be discussed at more length in Chapters 4
and 5.)
Thus, in order to be “aesthetically special,” the X’s made by the
Hindus would have to have been made with care as to their proportion,
color, and spatial relationship to the size of the door; and the room
constructed by the security police would have to be arranged with an eye
for visual relationship among the objects in the room, color coordination,
or accent—that is, with a sensory/emotional component that originally
evolved for enhancement, pleasure, and gratification over and above (or
along with) the sheerly informational or purposeful aspects which, in an
academic or analytic sense, we can isolate and separate out.
To evolving humans, as to those living in premodern societies
today, the “aesthetic pleasure” derived from making special is not
perhaps so easily separated from the “message” it packages as it has
become in Western art today. Although contemporary aesthetic
specialness, to be nonutilitarian or “more than necessary” (hence not
understandable as a selectively valuable behavioral tendency in human
evolution), in its original context, it was necessary and utilitarian. To
adapt an anthropological truism, the obligatory was converted—by
making it special—into the desirable, and hence it was willingly done.13
But even after establishing that aesthetic making special (in the
sense of being sensorily and emotionally gratifying and more than strictly
necessary) can be differentiated from nonaesthetic making special such as
marking or intimidating, it still remains true that even though all art can
be included as aesthetic making special, not all aesthetic making special is
art. In ritual and play, everyday reality is transformed, as in art, in
emotionally and sensorily gratifying ways, and thus can be appreciated
apart from use or practical function. I have not always been able to
separate instances of making special in “art” from those in “ritual” and
“play,” as from X’s on doors or torture chambers.
I do not think, however, that this difficulty seriously jeopardizes the
attempt to treat art—in the sense of making special—as a human
behavior. For if we step outside our blinkered Western modernist and
post-modernist paradigms where art is either grand, rare, and
intimidating or socially constructed, slick, and provocative, it should be
possible to accept the larger, more inclusive entity, making special
(including art, ritual, and play) as a universal behavior. That is, by
expanding our notion from “art” or even “art as making special” to “the




humanly grounded and relevant way how “the arts” (instances of making
special) originally arose and why they not only enhance our individual
lives as Homo aestheticus, but have been essential for our evolution as a
species.
The radical position that I offer here as a species-centered view of
art is that it is not art (with all its burden of accreted connotations from
the past two centuries) but making special that has been evolutionarily or
socially and culturally important. That is to say, until recent times in the
West, what has been of social, cultural, and individual evolutionary
importance in any art or “work of art” has been its making something
special that is important to the species, society, or culture.
There is no need to decide whether a theater or concert performance
is “play,””ritual,” or “art.” The three often interpenetrate, since
“metareality” and “specialness” generally presuppose the freedom,
unpredictability, make-believe, imagination, and delight that are
associated with play (and art), or the formality, stylization, elaboration,
and entrancement that characterize ritual (and art).
In What Is Art For? I likened the modern Western concept of art to
the Victorian notion of “vapours,” an ambiguous ailment that has long
since disappeared, or rather has been replaced by a number of particular
named maladies: depression, premenstrual syndrome, hypochondria, flu,
bad cold, and so forth. The analogy may have appeared to be merely an
amusing aside, but I think it deserves further attention. Indeed, I think
our understanding of art as a human behavior would improve if we
altogether banned the word art in its singular, conceptual form, just as we
no longer find it useful to invoke a broad term, vapours, for diverse
complaints that gain nothing by being clumped together.
Postmodernists, who claim that art is in any case only two centuries
old, should have little theoretical difficulty abandoning the word art,
although to be sure, it has permeated our thought from a practical point
of view and is probably impossible to eliminate. The reader should try to
remember, however, that henceforth in this book, reference to a “behavior
of art” means “aesthetic making special” as elucidated in this section,
which is a broader concept of “art” than is usual.
In Chapter 4, I will describe in more detail how a behavior of art
could have developed from the tendency to recognize an extra-ordinary
dimension of experience—that is, I will examine what circumstances in
the human evolutionary environment could have called forth and refined
such a behavioral tendency and hence why it should have been selected-
for. Before ending the discussion of making special, however, I think it
would be useful to summarize some of its implications for aesthetic
theory today.
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Implications of Making Special
The concept of making special, in the biobehavioral view of its being the
core defining feature of a behavior of art, casts a new light on previously
troublesome questions about the nature, origin, purpose, and value of art,
and its place in human life.
1. It explains how a concept of art can comprise such variety, even
contradiction. Art may be rare and restricted, as modernists believed, or
liberating and problematizing, as postmodernists argue. It may be well or
poorly done; it may be an individual original creation or a manifestation
of a codified historical or regional tradition. It may require talent and
long specialized training or be something everyone does naturally much
as they learn to swim or cook or hunt. It may be used for anything, and
anything can become an occasion for art. It may or may not be beautiful;
although making special often results in “making beautiful,” specialness
also may consist of strangeness, outrageousness, or extravagance. As
making special is protean and illimitable, so is art.
2. If the essential behavioral core is making special, a concern about
whether one or another example of it is or is not “art” becomes irrelevant.
One can, of course, ask whether one personally wants to take the time
and trouble to appreciate or attempt to appreciate its specialness.
Funding agencies will no doubt continue to debate whether certain
Robert Maplethorpe photographs, for example, are or are not “art” in
some restricted culture-centered sense. But from the species-centered
perspective with which this book is concerned, what is relevant is that
Homo aestheticus “needs” to make special and appreciate specialness.
Humans and their societies provide the means and parameters within
which to do (or not do) this and within which to evaluate the results.
3. At the same time, the idea of making special would not allow the
loose declaration (sometimes heard from postmodernists artists,
composers, and critics) that art is everything and everything is art. It may
be the case that anything is potentially art, but in order to be art, there is a
requirement, first, of aesthetic intention or regard and secondly, of
fashioning in some way—actively making special or imaginatively
treating as special. If art is everything and everything is art, or sound is
music and music is sound, as I have heard it said, why distinguish these
activities by calling them “art” or “music”?
4. Making special emphasizes the idea that the arts, biologically
endowed predispositions, have been physically, sensuously, and
emotionally satisfying and pleasurable to humans. By using elements that
pleased and gratified human senses—elements that themselves arose in
nonaesthetic contexts:  bright floors; appealing shapes and sounds;




significance14—and arrange and patterning these elements in unusual,
“special” ways, early humans assured the willing participation in, and
accurate performance of, ceremonies that united them. The arts “enabled”
ceremonies because they made ceremonies feel good. Before they were
ever consciously used to make things special, the satisfactions of rhythm,
novelty, order, pattern, color, bodily movement, and moving in
synchrony with others were fundamental animal pleasure, essential
ingredients of life. Using these bodily pleasurable elements to make
ceremonies special—elaborating and shaping them—the arts, and art,
were born.
5. My theory recognizes that art, or, more accurately, the desire to make
some things special, is a biologically endowed need. The impetus to mark
as “special” an expression or artifact, even our bodies, is deep-seated and
widespread. Quite naturally, we exaggerate, pattern, and otherwise alter
our movements or voices or words to indicate that what we are doing is
set apart from ordinary movement, intonation, and speech. More
essential than the result (the “work of art,” which can be striking or dull,
achieved or abandoned) is the behavior or the activity, and more
interesting, for our purposes, is the impetus that animates the behavior or
activity. Not all things are made special and those that are chosen are
usually made special for a reason. That reason throughout our
unrecorded evolutionary history, and also for most of recorded human
history, was different, more serious and emotionally involving, than the
reason or reasons involved with making special in the modern,
industrialized, Western or Western-influenced world.
6. My theory reminds us that the desire or need to make special has
been throughout human history, until quite recently, primarily in the
service of abiding human concerns—ones that engage our feelings in the
most profound ways. Until recently, the arts—when they were not play
or entertainment (which are legitimate and age-old ways of making
human life more than ordinary)—were used to address or at least to
suggest or intimate serious concerns. We moderns feel “art” to be a
private compulsion, a personal desire to mold or make something out of
one’s individual experience. But art actually originated and thrived for
most of human history as a communal activity: in the smaller and more
interdependent and like-minded societies in which humans evolved, the
need to make sense of experience was satisfied in communally valued
and validated activities. Much art today is rather like the display of a
captive, lone peacock vainly performed for human (not peahen)
spectators, or the following by baby geese of a bicycle wheel instead of
their mother. When an animal is removed from its natural milieu and
deprived of the cues and circumstances to which it is designed by nature
to respond, it will respond and behave as best it can but probably in
aberrant ways or with reference to aberrant cues and circumstances.
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The principal evolutionary context for the origin and development of
the arts was in activities concerned with survival. As we look back
through the eons, we see abundant evidence of humans making things or
experience special. Overwhelmingly what was chosen to be made special
was what was considered important: objects and activities that were parts
of ceremonies having to do with important transition, such as birth,
puberty, marriage, and death; finding food, securing abundance,
ensuring fertility of women and of the earth; curing the sick; going to war
or resolving conflict; and so forth. In the past, things were made special
because they were perennially important, while today we consider
something (anything) momentarily important because it has been made
flashily if transiently special.
This is an important difference and points up, I think, why in the
contemporary West we have been so preoccupied with and confused
about art, seduced by it, expecting miracles from it, alternatively feeling
elevated or dispirited by it, feeling somewhat betrayed if not altogether
scorned by it.
In Wallace Steven’s poem “Anecdote of the Jar,” a round jar is placed
on a hill in Tennessee and the “slovenly wilderness” surrounding it
immediately seems to fall into place. The jar becomes a kind of focus or
center—“it took dominion everywhere”—that gives meaning or relevance
to what before was wild, haphazard, and insignificant. In my ethological
terms, placing the jar in that unlikely place was “making it special”: an
instance, if you will, of artistic behavior. Steven’s poem that tells the story
also makes the deed (real or imagined) special by choosing unusual word
order (“and round it was upon that hill”), strange phrases (“and of a port
in air,””it did not give of bird or bush”), and rhyme (round/ground;
air/bare/where) for the telling. A beautiful and successful poem in the
high modernist tradition, “Anecdote of the Jar” is an exemplum of what a
modern or postmodern painter or sculptor does when she or he chooses a
subject and material and shapes and elaborates them, making special
what before her or his action and vision would have been ordinary and
unremarkable.
Yet, in premodern society, the hill, though slovenly and wild, would
most likely have been already somehow important: it would have been
the abode of a spirit, or the place where a valued person was killed, or the
site where a vision had occurred. Or perhaps the jar itself would have
been important—because of some sacredness involved in its making or
some magical marks added to its surface—so that placing it on the hill
would have been a way of bringing human or divine presence to the hill
or imparting a power to it. While such motives may still be the impetus
behind some artistic acts today, they need not be. The act alone, for its
own sake, is enough, and we have learned to respond to the act and its




Human evolution may have involved gratuitous acts of making
special, but it is difficult to see how these would have made sufficient
difference to the survival of individuals or groups to have been retained
by natural selection as a genetic predisposition (except perhaps insofar as
they are considered part of the general behavior of play, whose
motivation is quite different from acknowledging or creating or
celebrating importance). I admit that making special manifested as
playfulness or idiosyncrasy can be pleasurable and rewarding, but I
doubt whether in themselves they would have led before modern times
to the creations that have been enshrined as our most representative
examples of “art.”
7. To suggest that making important things special was the original
impetus for a “behavior of art” accounts for the close association in
historic times as well as in prehistory between the arts and
religion—more accurately, the ritual expression of religion.
The earliest anthropological observers noted the importance of
religion in human societies everywhere. Emile Durkheim, the great
French founder of sociology, called religion a unified system of beliefs
and practices related to sacred things—things set apart and forbidden
(1964, p. 62). These beliefs, practices, and things belong to a realm called
by different authors the numinous (Dodds, 1973), the serious (Shils, 1966),
the supernatural—all suggesting the extra-ordinary, outside ordinary life.
In the next chapter I will show that the origins of religious beliefs
and practices and the arts must have been inseparable and that the
ceremonies that have arisen in every human society for the purpose of
dealing with vital, emotionally significant, archetypal concerns expressed
these by means of arts. Yet before doing this I should remind the reader
that today in the modern West very little is, in Durkheim’s words, set
apart or forbidden. Indeed, being considered forbidden or taboo seems
cause and justification for being openly discussed and displayed.16
What is more, in the modern world, as Kaplan (1978, p. 86) has
pithily remarked, the interesting is no longer important, and the
important is no longer interesting. It seems worth asking whether the
confusing and unsatisfying state of art in our world has anything to do
with the fact that we no longer care about important things. In our
predominantly affluent and hedonistic society, survival is no longer
paramount for most of us, and spiritual concerns, while perhaps given
public lip service, are less and less privately validated. Our experience of
the extra-ordinary tends to be an ever-growing involvement with such
things as gambling, violent films, and mood-altering drugs. Caring
deeply about vital things is out of fashion, and, in any case, who has the
time (or allows the time) to care and to mark one’s caring?17  Human
history has demonstrated that people can endure surprising amounts of
hardship and suffering—conditions that usually elicit a serious and
religious attitude toward life. Whether people are as well equipped to
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thrive under conditions of unprecedented leisure, comfort, and plenty is a
question that is being tested on a large scale in our present circumstances:
the answer does not appear to be promising.
Notes
1. Paul Mattick, comment made during presentation in panel entitled “The
Institutions of Art/2” (Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American
Society for Aesthetics, 24-28 October 1989, New York City).
2. My account concerns Western aesthetics and does not attempt to address
aesthetic concepts in other civilizations or how they relate to those in the
West.
3. While my discussion in the text uses examples primarily from the visual
arts, the history, criticism, and theory of the other arts are much the same.
For example, Lydia Goehr (1989) makes a point similar to mine in her
analysis of the development of an abstract concept of a musical “work.”
4. “Play” theories of art are most commonly associated with Friedrich
Schiller (1795/1967), Herbert Spencer (1880-82), Sigmund Freud
(1908/1959), and Johan Huzinga (1949).
5. Richard Alexander (1989) explains human social play as leading “to an
expanding ability and tendency to elaborate and internalize social-
intellectual-physical scenarios,” which itself underlies the evolutionary
development of the human psyche—a neat combination of the human
appreciation of fantasy and reality. See my discussion of Alexander at the
end of Chapter 4.
6. Radcliffe-Brown (1922/1948) in his monograph on the Andaman
Islanders, stresses that ceremonies produce changes in or structure
feelings. They “maintain and transmit from one generation to another the
emotional dispositions on which the society depends for its existence” (p. 234,
my italics). Being obligatory, they compel participants to act as though
they felt certain emotions and thereby to some extent actually serve to
induce those emotions in them. See also the section on ritual and
dramatic performance in Chapter 5.
7. It was also intriguing for me to realize that play is often ritualized, as in
sport, with its special arena, costumes, ways of behaving, structure in
time. In rituals people often pretend (play or act “as if”): Australian
aborigines, for example, imitate animals or pretend to kill them, and the
Yanomamo Indians of South America do battle with spirits. Our “plays”
and performances in general, can be considered simultaneously as art, as
ritual, and as play.
8. Peter Sutton (1988, pp. 18-19) also states that in traditional Aboriginal
thought, there is no nature without culture. He quotes W. E. H. Stanner
(On Aboriginal Religion [1963, p. 277): “Anyone who…has moved in the
Australian bush with Aboriginal associates becomes aware…[that he]
moves not in a landscape but in a humanized realm saturated with
significations.”
9. Evidence of deliberate foresight and planning has been claimed for




their cooperative hunting strategies (Chase, 1989); in their hafting of stone
tools, which implies the ability to predict the likelihood of recurring tasks
requiring a particular tool (Shea, 1989); and in their transporting
artifactual material from afar to be used at home (Deacon, 1989). Hayden
and Bonifay (1991, p. 6) marshal data that “provide overwhelming
support for the notion that Neanderthals were curating lithic tools,
exhibiting planning and foresight similar to Upper Paleolithic people,
and acting in economically rational fashions.
10. The earliest archaeological evidence for body ornaments seems to date
from the transition from the Middle Paleolithic to the Upper Paleolithic,
that is, from around 35,000 B. P. It is interesting that these ornaments
were made primarily from exotic (i.e., “special”) materials, such as shell,
soft stone, teeth, and tusks, that had been brought sometimes from
hundreds of kilometers away from where they were excavated. Randall
White (1989b) suggests that the ornaments were used for social display
and were perhaps symbolic of social distinctions. Whatever their use or
significance, it is interesting to see that when making themselves special,
individuals also used special materials.
11. In The Creative Explosion (1982), John Pfeiffer presented a similar
reconstruction of art and ceremony in the Upper Paleolithic. His concern
was to elucidate the remarkable flowering of cultural behavior at that
time, and not to address ethologically art’s earlier origins and putative
selective value.
12. It was both amusing and gratifying to later discover that Arthur Danto
(1986, p. 21), who was not concerned with selective value or ethology,
argued that “the structure of artworks is of a piece with the structure of
rhetoric,” and that “it is the office of rhetoric to modify the minds and
then the actions of men and women by coopting their feelings.” Danto’s
idea of “the transfiguration of the commonplace” in contemporary
Western art (1981) is also congruent with a notion of making the ordinary
extra-ordinary or “making special.”
13. See note 6, this chapter. In his classic monograph (1922/1948), Radcliffe-
Brown explicitly states that ceremonies (in which, of course, objects and
activities are made special) transmit feelings.  More recent
anthropologists have been generally concerned with ceremonies
primarily as a means of transmitting information, traditions and symbols.
14. See Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989a; 1989b) for additional and fascinating examples
of appealing and arresting bioaesthetic elements arising from human
perception and behavior.
15. Even in the gestural sign language of the deaf, poetic statements are
signed in a different manner than everyday conversation. Rather than
using a dominant hand, the two hands are balanced; a smoothness of
movement is imposed on the signs; and they are given a rhythmic
temporal pattern and an enlarged “designed” spatial pattern, with
exaggerations of representational or pantomime aspects (Klima and
Bellugi ,1983).
16. In some areas of modern life disclosure and open discussion are still
frowned upon‚—e.g., military, government, and industrial affairs—but
the information associated with these realms does not really correspond
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to the kinds of information formerly considered numinous. Revealing
military or industrial secrets is considered far more deplorable than
exposing personal emotional or spiritually significant matters.
17. It is not only that we are too “busy” or sated to care. Caring usually
involves acting upon what one cares about (see Chapter 4). In our
pluralistic and impersonal society, we cannot usually affect change, or by
trying to do so, we may at the same time be going against other
important personal or group interests. Thus, not caring is self-protective
and a way of coping with impotence.
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